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WOJCIECH KALAGA
Tertium non datur? 
Wildness and Methodology
O f the two themes o f this paper, i.e., wildness and methodology, the latter will 
come first. This does not mean that it will attempt either to tame or to dominate, 
or to eclipse wildness. I will start by highlighting a methodological issue and then 
will seek support from the wild via certain analogies. The methodological ques­
tion that will be brought up surfaced at a departmental meeting with a paper on 
the marvellous, the feminine, and magic realism by Mary Macullan from the 
University o f North London. During our discussion regarding the problem of the 
manifestation o f the marvellous the discussants divided themselves into two 
opposing groups whose stances could be epitomized as the emphasis on differ­
ence, on the one hand, and the emphasis on similarity on the other hand.
According to the first group, the similar instances of the marvellous in dif­
ferent cultures are radically and irrevocably different in the sense o f manifesting 
an incompatibility o f the categories o f those cultures. Beowulf, for example, cannot 
be a manifestation o f the same marvellous which is embodied in the tales o f the 
South American magical realism. We could say that this stance acts on the prin­
ciple that no instances of similarity can overpower the differences that accompany 
them, to the extent that could allow generalizing claims o f sameness. The other 
stance acts on a radically opposite principle, namely that the various instances of 
difference cannot thwart the fundamental similarity as the basis o f systematizing 
generalizations. On this view, the various manifestations o f the marvellous, de­
spite the differences, are similar in the sense of manifesting some common pat­
tern (what we called, by an operational metaphor, an archetypal similarity). Fol­
lowing this stance, the marvellous in Beowulf, or say in Ursula Leguin, and in 
magical realism of South American prose, shares something in common, however 
ineffable or sublime that something might be.
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It is quite obvious that the first stance -  the one emphasizing difference -  does 
not renounce similarity as a critical principle. On the contrary, we see the expo­
nents of this stance move between the most distant textual lands for the sake of 
engineering a bricolage of analogies and similarities. There is one condition, how­
ever, which must be observed. These similarities have to be contingent and not 
necessary, i.e., they must be incidental, annuling a hypothetical underlying sys­
tem to prove that globalizing systems do not exist. In other words, they must not 
be generic similarities which confirm the existence of a totalizing systemic force. 
Just like the first stance does not renounce similarity, so the second stance -  the 
one emphasizing similarity -  does not renounce difference, but uses it as the 
principle o f semantic discrimination within its grids, typologies, and genealogies. 
Unlike in the case of the first stance, however, these differences must be ruled 
by necessity and not by contingency, i.e., in the Saussurean manner they must 
represent the system itself.
Now, there are two kinds o f error which both these stances may commit. First, 
that error could be primarily ethical, i.e., it could consist in the totalitarian im­
position of the globalizing necessity by those who belief in the System, and of 
the hypocritical pretence of those who denounce all truth (or the possibility of truth), 
the System including, and at the same time claim that their opponents are wrong. 
Secondly, the error could consist in the denial or neglect to acknowledge that both 
positions find their ultimate semblance in the Kantian predicament, i.e., that in 
both cases the structures of mind, o f perception, of cognition and recognition (or 
whatever more or less technical or poetic way one chooses to call them) deter­
mine the constitution o f the constructed object. The result o f these errors is 
a polarization of stances leading to their incompability and incommensurability. 
If those errors are avoided, however, the impending polarization will give way to 
a contestation of the logic of duality.
Let us briefly reiterate. O f the two methodological positions I described at the 
beginning, the first relies on necessity while the second on contingency. Yet, unless 
the exponents of the two stances stand by the errors mentioned above, no radical 
contradiction between them is established. For the opposition between them is not 
the opposition between extremities of the same qualities or values, like that between 
the necessity o f difference and contingency o f difference, or between the neces­
sity o f similarity and contingency o f similarity. On the contrary, while their strong 
principles, which are the necessity of difference (systematicity) on the one hand, 
and contingency of similarity (fragmentation, incidentality) on the other hand, 
remain as central methodological determinants o f two extreme poles, there remains 
a whole spectrum of floating relations of difference and similarity between those 
two poles. It happens so because the assumption of the former stance (i.e., the 
necessity o f difference) does not in fact exclude the contingency of similarity, even 
though it relegates it from the centre of its attention; and vice versa, the assump­
tion o f the second stance (the contingency o f similarity) does not exclude the
necessity o f difference, but likewise relegates it to the margins o f its vision. And 
it is exactly this slight deviation, a slight curve, an oscillation within the oppo­
sition o f the two stances -  consisting in a clash of necessity and contingency, but 
a clash relating to two different values -  that contests the tertium non datur 
principle and circumscribes an area o f common inquiry.
Two interim observations suggest themselves at this stage. First, on 
a microscale, one notices that -  despite appearances -  the relation between the 
two stances is not based on mutual exclusion or incommensurability. While they 
remain in opposition on many levels o f reference, they also share an area of 
potential consensus. Rather than as a polarized dichotomy or a binary opposition 
we should look at those stances as determinants of a methodological spectrum. 
Secondly, on a macroscale, if one were to risk a generalization, the floating relation 
between the two axes of the opposition (necessity-contingency; difference-simi- 
larity) accounts for the continuity, or what Barthes calls glissement, between struc­
turalism and poststructuralism (the former, roughly speaking, relying on the 
necessity o f difference, while the latter on the contingency o f similarity), and 
explains why these two discursive formations cannot, in fact, be seen as separated 
by radical breech.
What has been said so far seems pretty civilised, and it is only here that wild­
ness comes in by way of a certain analogy. This analogy is neither directly con­
ceptual nor directly structural, but is based on the ability o f the wild to resist the 
regime of the tertium non datur principle, which, as we have seen, was also 
overcome by the floating relation o f contingency and necessity in our methodo­
logical question.
The word “wild” is internally rifted and fissured from within in a way which 
suggests its particular usefulness for subverting the logic o f duality. First, and 
paradoxically, the word Wild is more civilised than any other word: it not only 
tames reality, as does any other word, but also immediately, in one gesture, tames 
that which it proclaims untamed (the wild). To name a fragment o f reality (to call 
it wild, for example) is first to isolate and identify it and than to subdue it to our 
linguistic will, to tame it, or as some o f us would say, to colonize it. We might 
pastiche Heidegger’s “naming is calling” 1 into “naming is taming”. The wild existed 
truly only at the state of untained, undifferentiated wildness before the existence 
of the word, i.e., before the possibility of the Other. But then, it did not know 
it was so wild, it did not know it was wild at all. Only naming made it knowingly 
wild, but unknowingly tamed. Naming is calling, naming is taming. Wild is thus 
also richer even than those words, which posit their oppositions only for the sake
1 Martin Heidegger, “Language”, in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. A. Hofstadter (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1971).
Tertium non datur? Wildness and Methodology 13
o f their own becoming, but then annihilate those oppositions as invalid (for 
example, in the poststructuralist discourse metaphorical posits literal in order to 
establish its own distinctiveness only to encroach on the semantic terrain of this 
posited opposition and to monopolize that terrain without exception, thus leaving 
literal empty). In the case of Wild the conflict occurs within the word, and wildness, 
albeit retained, is also re-tained. Wildness as a concept contains in itself its own 
contradiction and thus of itself contradicts the laws o f binary logic.
Despite the doubts, or perhaps because o f the doubts regarding its clear-cut 
nature, one feels the need to find a pivotal point which might become a point of 
reference for the distinction between the cultured/human and wild as the other. 
That point o f reference could be memory, or teleology, or regularity,.or in fact 
any o f the connotative values that enter into semantic play within the opposition; 
none of those mentioned, however, seems to be able to perform that pivotal role. 
A factor capable of a radical and definitive insight must come from the utmost 
moment of existence, and that factor -  which also touches other related concepts 
such as language, interpretation, or being -  is the invention o f  death as a cultural 
caesura between two eschatologically separate domains.
A very strong impulse to posit the awareness o f death as the pivotal indication 
of what is appropriately human as opposed to the other (or, metaphorically speak­
ing, to the wild), comes, of course, from Heidegger. His concepts of Sein-zum- 
Tode (Being-towards-Death) and of the profound awe (Angst) the awareness of 
death evokes, determine the authenticity of human existence and differentiate it 
from OTHER ways of being. But there is an even stronger and more radical impulse 
which, given its essential dyadicity, comes from an unexpected direction, namely 
from the poetry of W. B. Yeats:
Death
Nor dread nor hope attend a dying animal;
A man awaits his end 
Dreading and hoping all;
Many times he died, Many times rose again.
A great man in his pride 
Confronting murderous men 
Casts derision upon 
Supersession of breath;
Man knows death to the bone —
Man has created death.
This is primarily a political poem inspired by the assassination o f Kevin 
O ’Higgins, Vice-President o f the Irish Free State. Let us, however, disregard its 
political and historical reference and concentrate only on the general judgements 
that Yeats makes, i.e., on the first couplet and the last line of the poem: “Nor dread 
nor hope attend a dying anim al...  Man has created death.”
Here, it is not even the awareness (as in Heidegger), but the invention, the 
creation o f death that distinguishes man from beast. By positing death as a human 
invention Yeats reinstates the perennial western dichotomy and introduces a radi­
cal opposition between the civilized (cultured, linguistic, semiotic) and the non­
civilized, i.e., the wild, which does not differentiate between phases of the organic 
processes occurring in the world, supersession o f breath including.
This anthropocentric and dichotomous attitude is confirmed in at least two other 
poems by Yeats (“The Tower” and “Vaccillation”) and also in “The Death of 
a Hare” where death and wildness actually come together:
The Death o f  a Hare
I have pointed out the yelling pack,
The hare leap to the wood,
And when I pass a compliment 
Rejoice as lover should 
At the drooping o f an eye,
At the mantling o f the blood.
Then suddenly my heart is wrung 
By her distracted air 
And I remember wildness lost 
And after, swept from there,
Am set down standing in the wood 
At the death o f the hare.
Here, the death of a hare is wildness lost. But the equation of death with the
loss of wildness can occur only from the perspective of man: of the one who in­
vented death as the ultimate moment of life. For man, the invention of death as finality 
entails the concept of necessity, while for the animal -  if we impose our anthro­
pomorphic categories again -  dying is in a sense a matter of contingency which does 
not eliminate one from nature, even though it does involve a supersession of breath; 
organic processes continue to take place embracing the dying-dead organism, albeit 
differently. By pointing to the eschatological difference between man and beast, i.e., 
between the order o f civilization and the order of the wild, Yeats draws the polar 
opposition between the necessary and the contingent.
Let us now take a brief look at another poem about man, death and beast, which, 
however, overpowers the polar duality established by Yeats’ “Death”.
Kot w pustym mieszkaniu
Umrzeć -  tego nie robi się kotu.
Bo co ma począć kot 
w pustym mieszkaniu.
Wdrapywać się na ściany.
Ocierać między meblami.
Nic tu niby nie zmienione,
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a jednak pozamieniane.
Nic nie przesunięte, 
a jednak porozsuwane.
I wieczorami lampa już nie świeci.
Słychać kroki na schodach, 
ale to nie te.
Ręka, co kładzie rybę na talerzyk, 
także nie ta co kładła.
Coś się tu nie zaczyna
0 swojej zwykłej porze.
Coś się tu nie odbywa 
jak powinno.
Ktoś tutaj był i był, 
a potem nagle zniknął
1 uporczywie go nie ma.
Do wszystkich szaf się zajrzało.
Przez półki przebiegło.
Wcisnęło się pod dywan i sprawdziło.
Nawet złamało zakaz 
i rozrzuciło papiery.
Co więcej jest do zrobienia.
Spać i czekać.
Niech-no on tylko wróci, 
niech-no się pokaże.
Już on się dowie,
że tak z kotem nie można.
Będzie się szło w jego stronę 
jakby się wcale nie chciało, 
pomalutku,
na bardzo obrażonych łapach.
I żadnych skoków pisków na początek.
[A Cat in an Empty Flat
To die -  you don’t do that to a cat.
For what should a cat do 
In an empty flat.
Climb the walls.
Rub its back against furniture.
Nothing has changed -  it seems, 
but it has.
Nothing has been moved -  it seems, 
but it has been.
And the lamp is out at night.
One hears footsteps on the stairs, 
but not the footsteps.
Nor is the hand that puts the fish on the plate 
the one that used to be.
Something here does not begin 
at the usual time.
Something does not happen 
as it should.
Someone was here, and was, 
and then suddenly was no more 
and persistently is not here.
One has looked into the wardrobes.
One has run through all the shelves.
One has squeezed oneself under the carpet to check.
One has even done the forbidden 
and scattered the papers.
What else can one do.
Sleep and wait.
But let him just come,
let him just show him self here.
He will soon find out
such things are not done to the cat.
One will walk towards him 
as if  one did not want to at all, - 
very' slowly, 
feet sulking.
And no jumping, miaowing at the start.]
The strategy o f the poem relies on an internally incongruent persona. Even 
though the monologue is in the third person, and in spite o f its anthropomorphic 
tinge, the speaker in the poem is the cat describing its own experience of absence. 
The first line -  despite an apparently impersonal tenor -  is integrated into the 
monologue’s unity and reflects the cat’s awareness o f death (“To die -  you don’t 
do that to a cat”). As we proceed, however, that awareness o f death is put into 
question, particularly in the third stanza and especially through its final styliza­
tion o f naivete (“Someone was here, and was, and then suddenly was no more”). 
Eventually, the last lines reflect the cat’s innocence of the knowledge of death (“But 
let him just com e. . .  etc.”). What occurs in the poem is an anthropomorphization 
of the cat through the projection of a human perspective (after all, as Yeats suggests, 
it is man who has created death) -  a kind o f a taming o f the cat (wild) -  and at 
the same time a rejection o f that perspective. In effect, the dichotomy man-cat, 
or more generally: civilised-other, is broken and fuzziness retrospectively domi­
nates the poem. The epitome of this fuzziness, and a foretoken of the contestation 
o f binarity, are the four pre-final lines o f the first stanza (“Nothing has changed
-  it seems, but it has”).
If  the Yeats’ poem foregrounds death as the radical mark of humanity, 
Szymborska’s poem -  while subtly confirming the anthropomorphicity of death
-  at the same time circumscribes a terrain common and undistinguishable to man 
and the other (the cat, the wild). Yeats establishes death as a binary logic of the
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difference BETWEEN; Szymborska establishes death as a cojoining difference, 
a difference which not only demands, but also entails similarity, or in other words 
a difference WITHIN. When referred to the theoretical question posed at the be­
ginning of this paper, Yeats illustrates the methodology of polarity : looking through 
his glasses at the two stances described earlier one would be determined to discern 
only oppositions. Szymborska, on the other hand, is a methodologist of the spec­
trum: while only subtly signalling the binarity of the poles, she most of all explores 
the illogical terrain between them. It is this wild terrain of the spectrum, which 
contests the tertium non datur principle, that I want to postulate as the area of our 
exploration.
2 The W ild
